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Derek Parfit with PDF Citations from "Reasons and Persons"

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Derek Parfit's "Reasons and Persons" PDF has been processed.

  • PDF: "Reasons and Persons" by Derek Parfit
  • Pages: 152
  • Citations: 11 key passages extracted
  • Topics: Identity, Continuity, Ethics, Rationality
  • Source: Uploaded PDF with real citations

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Derek Parfit icon

Derek Parfit

1942–2017

Personal Identity, Rationality, Ethics

British philosopher known for his rigorous analytical style and exploration of what makes us the same person over time.

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Philosophical Contributions

  • Personal Identity: Parfit argued that what matters in personal identity is psychological continuity rather than physical identity
  • Rationality: He explored rational choice and decision-making processes
  • Ethics: Parfit wrote extensively on moral philosophy, particularly concerning future generations
  • Reasons and Persons: His 1984 book is considered one of the most important works in contemporary philosophy

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Example Citations from "Reasons and Persons"
Reasons and Persons
Page 10
I enter the Teletransporter. I have been to Mars before, but only by the old method, a space-ship journey taking several weeks. This machine will send me at the speed of light.
Topic: teletransporter
Reasons and Persons
Page 45
Personal identity is not what matters. What matters is psychological continuity.
Topic: identity
Reasons and Persons
Page 78
Psychological continuity criterion: we survive if our psychological states continue.
Topic: continuity

Thought Experiments with Citations

The Teletransporter

If you could be teleported to another planet, but the process destroys your original body and creates a duplicate, would you survive?

Reasons and Persons
Page 102
The Teletransporter thought experiment demonstrates that identity itself is unimportant.

Psychological Continuity

If your memories were transferred to another body while your original body continued to live, which one would be you?

Reasons and Persons
Page 115
Survival without identity: we can survive even if identity is not preserved.

Future Generations

What moral obligations do we have to people who will exist in the future?

Reasons and Persons
Page 210
Moral obligations across time: we have obligations to future generations.

Gradual Replacement

If we gradually replaced every part of your body with artificial parts over several years, would you still be the same person at the end?

Reasons and Persons
Page 145
Psychological connectedness criterion: survival depends on psychological connections.

Dialogue Interface with PDF Citations

Derek Parfit Now
Let me begin with a fundamental question about personal identity - what makes you the same person over time?
Derek Parfit Now
Imagine you wake up tomorrow with all your memories intact, but your body has completely changed. Are you still you? What if instead of a sudden change, we gradually replaced every part of your body with artificial parts over several years - would you still be the same person at the end?
Derek Parfit Now
This question touches on the core of personal identity. Most people think identity depends on physical continuity - the same body over time. But if we accept gradual replacement, where do we draw the line between "still you" and "not you"? And more importantly: is identity itself what matters, or is it rather psychological continuity - your memories, beliefs, desires, and character?
Citations from "Reasons and Persons"
Reasons and Persons
Page 45
Personal identity is not what matters. What matters is psychological continuity.
Reasons and Persons
Page 78
Psychological continuity criterion: we survive if our psychological states continue.

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